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SMOKING GUNS:
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONFRONTS
THE TOBACCO AND GUN LOBBIES
Allan C. Hutchinson and
David Schneiderman

They rode into Ottawa wearing sharp suits and
carrying expensive briefcases, accompanied by a
posse of well-placed lobbyists and high-priced lawyers. It was a put-up or shut-up showdown between
multi-natiorial tobacco companies, RJR-MacDonald
and Imperial Tobacco, and the Canadian government.
With the eyes of the world upon them, it was constitutional high noon in Ottawa's Supreme Court corral.
In dispute was the ability of the federal government
to curtail the corporate speech of tobacco companies
aimed at inducing consumption of the principal cause
of cancer in North America. But there was much
more at stake. In the shadow of the tobacco lobby
was the equally powerful gun lobby. The fate of gun
control legislation passing through Parliament would
be threatened by any decision in favour of the
tobacco legislation.
As we now know, the tobacco lobby was successful in its efforts to set aside the most restrictive
aspects of the Tobacco Products Control Act. Much
of the commentary on the RJR-MacDonald' has
concentrated on the Charter dimensions of that
decision, particularly the implications for the regulation of commercial speech generally. In this comment, we want to take a different focus and concen trate on the federalism implications of the case - the
extent of the federal criminal law power. The federal
government's 'exclusive' jurisdiction under section
91(27) hasalways been a difficult and dynamic category of power to circumscribe: its scope is potentially limitless and can subvert the division of powers
between the federal and provincial legislatures. With
succinct understatement, Justice Estey was close to
the mark when he noted that "criminal law is easier
to recognise than to define." 2 In seeking to set some
guidelines and limits, the courts have tended to swing
between unrealistically narrow and broad interpretations. Striking a considered and consistent balance
has proved an elusive task for the courts. As the most

recent effort in this process of delineation and definition, RJR-MacDonald gives a progress report on
where the Supreme Court is and where it might be
going. However, as with so much earlier case law
about the criminal law power, there is more smoke
and mirrors than anything else.

SMOKE AND MIRRORS
The federal government's power under section 91
to prohibit and regulate commercial advertising came
under serious threat in RJR-MacDonald.The sobering
reality of that threat is dramatized by the disagreement amongst all levels of courts about the source of
the federal power to prohibit and regulate tobacco
advertising. At the Quebec Superior Court, Chabot J.
held that the federal government did not have the
power to enact a prohibition on tobacco advertising
or require mandatory health warnings;, no authority
could be found under the federal criminal law power
or the 'national dimensions' branch of the peace
order and good government power. The Quebec
Court of Appeal thought differently. It unanimously
held that the federal government could enact the
Tobacco Products Control Act under the national
dimensions branch of POGG. According to the
Court, the problem of tobacco consumption in
Canada has reached such proportions as to be of
national concern, having the singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that distinguishes matters of
national concern from matters of local provincial
concern. The Act, however, could not be justified
under the federal criminal law power as tobacco
consumption and its promotion by advertising did not
have "an affinity with a traditional criminal law
concern." 3 The Supreme Court of Canada, Justices
Sopinka and Major dissenting on this point, agreed
with the Quebec Court of Appeal that the Act was a
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valid exercise of federal power, but under the federal
power to make criminal law; they declined to offer an
opinion on its constitutional validity under the POGG
power.
Why such confusion among so many and so
learned judges about the ambit of the federal criminal
law power? Apart from and in addition to the overall
indeterminacy of constitutional law, the confusion can
be traced back to the decisions of the late nineteenth
century Privy Council. By circumscribing the federal
regulation of trade and commerce to no one specific
trade in Parsons and denying jurisdiction to the
federal government to prohibit trade other than in the
exceptional circumstances that give rise to the exercise of the POGG power, the Privy Council curtailed
federal ability to control important economic levers
through the trade and commerce power.' But as long
as an enactment concerned prohibitions with penal
consequences attached, 5 the criminal law power
could serve as the convenient vehicle for every kind
of regulation, economic or otherwise - laws prohibiting combinations and price discrimination were
justified early in the twentieth century 6 and, later in
the century, those prohibiting resale price maintenance and the continuation or repetition of an illegal
combinations were upheld under the criminal law
power. 7 This state of affairs inspired Bora Laskin to
write in the third edition of his case-book that "[riesort to the criminal law power to proscribe undesirable
commercial practices is to-day as characteristic of its
exercise as has been resort thereto to curb violence or
immoral conduct." 8
So expansive was this power that the federal
government was driven to invoke the criminal law
power even to regulate the insurance industry9 and to
prohibit the production of margarine. In the Margarine Reference case, the Supreme Court of Canada
decided that enough was enough and tried to place
some limits on the criminal law power. In a famous
judgment, Justice Rand sought to narrow the unrestricted scope of the criminal law power to those laws
that had a "criminal public purpose." He maintained
that such ends were served by laws which had as
their purpose "public peace, order, security, health,
morality" because these were the "ordinary though
not exclusive ends served" by the criminal law.'"
Decades later, the criminal law power still retains
pivotal importance as the repository of much that was
denied the federal government under its general
power over trade and commerce." Nevertheless, it
is hard to reach any other conclusion than that Rand's
'triple-p' formula - prohibition + penalty + pur-
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pose - only starts off any rigorous doctrinal analysis; it does not and cannot complete the task without
much more.
In RJR-MacDonald, the Supreme Court was
asked by the tobacco manufacturers to find the
Tobacco Products Control Act beyond federal competence as being largely in the nature of economic
regulation within the scope of provincial jurisdiction.
The Court refused the invitation, accepting that the
criminal law could justify federal intervention in the
powerful tobacco manufacturing industry by hampering its alluring packaging and prohibiting its advertising campaigns.
Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice La
Forest concluded that the restriction of advertising
and the requirement of mandatory labelling qualified
as an exercise of the criminal law power. The pith
and substance of the Act - that process of identifying the dominant purpose of legislation which drives
the constitutional analyses in division of powers cases
was identified as a concern with public health. 2
Health is not an enumerated head of power, but is
rather a subject matter of divided jurisdiction over
which the provinces and the federal government have
an interest. Indeed, Justice Rand had earlier confirmed health as one of the ordinary ends served by
the criminal law, that of safeguarding the public from
"injurious or undesirable effect." '" According to La
Forest J., the scope of the federal power to create
criminal legislation with respect to health matters is
broad, and is "circumscribed only by the requirements that the legislation must contain a prohibition
accompanied by a penal sanction and must be
directed at a legitimate public health evil." 4 That is,
the law must not be a colourable attempt to intrude
into the realm of provincial jurisdiction. By way of
example, La Forest J. argues that a law would be
colourable if it pertained only to a particular industry
(Parsons and Labatt) or only to the regulation of
advertising generally (Irwin Toy). He considered
these both to be areas of provincial concern.
It could not be said that this was a colourable
intrusion into provincial jurisdiction. According to La
Forest J., the law's underlying concern was not the
regulation of advertising because it then "surely
would have enacted legislation applying to advertising
in more than one industry." 5 On the other hand, if
the concern was the regulation of the tobacco industry
as an industry, he was of the view that "it would
surely have enacted provisions that relate to such
matters as product quality, pricing and labour

relations." 6 In somewhat circular fashion, the Court
held that it was not advertising generally because the
Act applied to only one industry and it was not
regulation of one industry because it did not concern
aspects of production in that industry. To bootstrap
his argument, Justice La Forest explained that
Parliament chose not to prohibit the tobacco industry
itself (by outlawing consumption, for example) for
the simple reason that it was "not a practical policy
option at this time." 7 Applying a mix of realpolitik
and behavioural science, La Forest J.explained that,
as cigarettes are a highly addictive product and over
one-third of Canadians smoke, a prohibition on
consumption likely would be resisted. Prohibition
could lead, as it did earlier in the century to an
increase in "smuggling and crime."'" Given the
complex social problems created by tobacco
consumption (this provides the lead-in to La Forest
J. 's deference to Parliament in his discussion of least
"innovative legislative
restrictive alternatives),
them effectively. "'9
to
address
required
solutions are
The effectiveness of this legislative solution, however, is not one which the Court would broach in its
federalism review: "the goal in pith and substance
analysis is to determine Parliament's underlying
purpose in a enacting a particular piece of legislation;
it is not to determine whether Parliament has chosen
that purpose wisely or whether Parliament would
have achieved that purpose more effectively by
legislating in other ways. 20
Justices Major and Sopinka expressed disagreement with the majority view in respect of the ban on
tobacco advertising. While the requirement of product
warnings could be justified under the federal criminal
law power, the advertising ban could not be as it did
not concern a "typically criminal public purpose. " 2
In a significant modification of Rand's formulation in
the MargarineReference, the two dissenters proposed
a narrow test for determining whether a subject was
in pith and substance a matter for the criminal law:
the activity to be suppressed "must pose a significant,
grave and serious risk of harm to public health,
morality, safety or security." 22 The type of commercial speech targeted by the Act did not meet the test
of gravity and seriousness in endangering public
health.
Furthermore, the dissenting judges disagreed
with the majority on two further points - the validity
of ancillary regulation and the relevance of exemptions. On the first issue, La Forest J.had written that

activities ancillary to an 'evil' could be prohibited
even though the underlying evil remains unregulated.
Relying on similar ancillary prohibitions on prostitution and assisted suicide, the majority found it constitutionally unimpeachable, even though Parliament had
taken a "circuitous path" to accomplish the goal of
lessening tobacco consumption. In contrast, the
minority could see no analogy between the
criminalization of activities that follow in the wake of
prostitution or assisted suicide and tobacco consumption. According to Major, "[tiobacco advertising is in
itself not sufficiently dangerous or harmful to justify
criminal sanctions," 23 disregarding the fact that it is
the suppression of tobacco consumption that is the
targeted evil and not simply commercial speech. On
the second issue, the minority found that the exemptions in the Act accorded to publications and broadcasts from outside of Canada suggested that the Act
was in the nature of economic regulation rather than
criminal law. If 65% of the Canadian magazine
market would still include tobacco advertisements,
despite the prohibition, how could a criminal prohibition be justified simply by virtue of an
advertisement's Canadian origins?24 The majority
replied by referring to the rule of interpretation that
a law does not lose its criminal character merely
because it contains exemptions; this was the case, for
instance, in Canada's former criminal code prohibition on abortions outside of accredited hospitals.'
The minority, suggesting that the federal POGG
power might provide appropriate authority for the
advertising ban, preferred not to "come to any
conclusion on this point" in view of their agreement
with the majority that, in any event, the Act failed
under the Charter.26
The upshot of RJR-MacDonald is that, while
there are very real problems with banning tobacco
advertising entirely so long as tobacco remains a
legally available substance, the Supreme Court has
confirmed that the federal government is well within
its jurisdiction and rights to ban tobacco consumption
and to place some Charter-warranted restrictions on
tobacco advertising. Moreover, the victory for the
tobacco lobby has been bought at a high price for the
gun lobby. It now seems almost certain that the
Supreme Court will reject any constitutional challenge
to the new Firearms Act based on the division of
powers. When the smoke clears, it will be seen that
the tobacco lobby has shot the gun lobby where it
hurts most.

(1995) 7:1 CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM

GUNS AND ROSES
The government has introduced gun control
legislation in the form of the new Firearms Act. 28
As well as amending various sections in Part III of
the Criminal Code, the Act provides for a comprehensive licensing system for those persons possessing
or wishing to possess firearms that are not prohibited
or restricted. To this extent, the Act builds on a set
of existing and constitutionally-valid rules that prohibit or restrict the possession of certain firearms. In
future, the possession and sale, import or export, of
all firearms will be subject to control and regulation.
The stated purpose of the legislation is to increase
public safety and control crime by ensuring that all
firearms - potentially dangerous and life-threatening
devices - are registered. The Act does not prevent
the ownership of firearms, but requires that they be
registered and controlled. In light of the fact that
there are roughly 1400 firearm deaths each year, 29
the measures appear to be modest and reasonable,
bringing Canada in line with laws in most other
countries. Indeed, the FirearmsAct is considered by
the gun control lobby to be too timid in the face of
havoc wreaked by people using guns.
To no one's surprise, the gun lobby has resisted
the introduction of the Firearms Act with all the
political and legal might that it can muster. Their
central contention is that there is no established
correlation between the ownership of firearms and a
propensity to commit crimes and that registration will
only interfere with the proprietary rights of lawabiding citizens and not prevent the use of illegallyobtained firearms in criminal activities. Apart from
the many policy and social arguments that it has
sought to deploy, the gun lobby has argued strenuously that this legislation is unconstitutional in origin and
content. Its initial position has been that such legislation falls outside the federal government's legitimate
authority under section 91(27) and more properly
falls under provincial jurisdiction. As best as can be
gathered, its contention is that, while the restriction
and prohibition of guns may at times be criminal in
nature and, therefore, validly federal in jurisdiction,
the imposition of a licensing and registration scheme
is traditionally a matter of 'property and civil rights'
and, therefore, falls under exclusive provincial
authority. Whatever (dubious) merit this argument
might have previously held now seems to have been
effectively scotched by the Supreme Court's decision
in RJR- MacDonald.
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Prior to the decision in RJR-MacDonald, the
constitutional position seemed to be reasonably wellestablished.' The federal government has the clear
authority to legislate under its criminal law power to
prevent as well as to control crime. For instance, in
the 1981 case of Pattison, the Alberta Court of
Appeal upheld the validity of the federal law which
provides for the seizure of firearms in the interests of
public safety:3"
The legislation may be preventative of
crime.... When the object is to reduce the
incidence of injury or death to the citizens of
the country by the type of violence made
possible by the destructive power of a firearm, it becomes clearly within the legislative
competence of the Government of Canada
under the head of criminal law to so enact.
Also, the courts have made clear that it is entirely
legitimate for the federal government to create
regulatory offences (as opposed to so-called 'true'
crimes32) that are ancillary to the exercise of its
criminal law power. Furthermore, the fact that
criminal laws are not part of the Criminal Code is not
determinative; the nomenclature of the legislation is
not decisive in matters of constitutionality.
If the federal government's jurisdiction to enact
the FirearmsAct was ever open to any doubt, it has
been almost entirely swept away by the Supreme
Court in RJR-MacDonald. The majority of the Court,
in confirming that the criminal law power is plenary
in nature, broad in definition, flexible over time, and
catholic in substance, held that the challenged
Tobacco Products Control Act had an underlying
public purpose - the containment of the detrimental
effects caused by tobacco consumption - that was
criminal in nature. The fact that Parliament had not
criminalised the ultimate 'evil' of tobacco consumption was not at all determinative: "it would be absurd
to limit Parliament's power to legislate in this emerging area simply because it cannot as a practical matter
impose a restriction more specifically aimed at the
evil." 33 Although the Act did not serve a purpose
that was traditionally or commonly considered to be
criminal, the federal government's criminal law
power enabled it to create new crimes. Accordingly,
if the ban on tobacco advertising could be validly
criminalised on the basis that it helped to protect
Canadians' health from smoking, there seems little
reason to believe that the licensing of gun ownership

to protect Canadians' safety from firearm injuries
could not equally be validated as an exercise of the
criminal law power. Insofar as the smoking of
tobacco threatens people, then it must also be so for
the use of firearms.
But perhaps even more telling is the opinion of
the dissenting minority in RJR-MacDonald. Mindful
that their judgments were driven by an overriding
concern to ensure that the criminal law power is not
used indiscriminately by the federal government to
bring anything and everything within its constitutional
mandate, the words and arguments of Justices
Sopinka and Major offer weighty support for the
validity of the Firearms Act. They held that the
definitional heart of the federal criminal law power is
to be found in the authority to prohibit conduct which
poses "a significant and serious risk of harm to
public health, safety or security."' Although they
held that tobacco advertising was too far removed
from the injurious effects of tobacco use to fall within
the scope of the criminal law power, it seems reasonable to assume that they would find that the connection between gun control and injurious conduct was
not so remote. In an important aside, Justice Major
opined that the only ancillary matters that have and
can fall within the scope of the criminal law power
are those where the core activity "concerns matters
which have traditionally been subject to criminal
sanctions and pose significant and serious dangers in
and of themselves." 3 Whatever the case may be
with the smoking of tobacco, the possession and use
of firearms continues to be a conventional matter of
criminal regulation.36
Of course, the full extent of the criminal law
power can only be appreciated and assessed when the
use of that power to invalidate provincial legislation
is canvassed. It is only when the courts take as broad
an interpretation of the federal government's criminal
law power in actions to challenge provincial legislation as they do in validating federal legislation that
there is real cause for alarm. If the criminal law
power is treated as expansively when provincial law
is being challenged as when federal legislation is
being defended, there is good reason to doubt the
wisdom of the Supreme Court's in RJR-MacDonald.
Such an interpretation would exert a considerable
centripetal and unwelcome force on the balance of
constitutional jurisdiction. However, in recent years,
the Supreme Court's treatment of the criminal law
power to curtail provincial legislation has continued
to accommodate the reasonable exercise of provincial
powers in areas that are commonly perceived to be

criminal in nature and scope.37 Relying upon the
provinces power under section 92(15) to impose
"punishment by fine, penalty or imprisonment," the
courts have tended to uphold provincial penal legislation; concurrent and overlapping jurisdiction is alive
and well in some areas of criminal regulation. Moreover, the courts have not been quick to regard the
existence of similar federal and provincial schemes to
regulate anti-social conduct as bringing the paramountcy doctrine into play.3"
In Morgentaler (No. 3), the Supreme Court
struck down a provincial law that required certain
designated medical procedures, including abortion, to
be performed in hospitals. The province claimed that
this measure was intended to prohibit privatization in
order to maintain high-quality health care and was,
therefore, within the province's constitutional jurisdiction. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
determined that the legislation's real purpose was to
"suppress the perceived harm or evil of abortion
clinics"39 and held it to be an invalid incursion into
the federal governmeiit's criminal law jurisdiction. At
the heart of Sopinka's judgment for the Court was the
insistence that, while the establishment and enforcement of a local standard of morality does not necessarily invade the field of criminal law, "interdiction of
conduct in the interest of public morals was and
remains one of the classic ends of the criminal
law."' The effect of this very strong judgment is to
jar the general belief that, provided that a province
has a viable claim to jurisdiction under a valid head
of provincial power, there is plenty of room for
concurrent jurisdiction in matters concerning social
regulation. However, in light of the Supreme Court's
emphatic judgment in RJR-MacDonald, the judgment
in Morgentaler may prove to be more of an aberration, driven more by the Court's irritation at a
province's duplicity in trying to slip one by the courts
and the constitution, than the beginning of a new
trend in criminal law doctrine.
In many ways, the gun lobby's challenge to the
FirearmsAct on federalism grounds is speculative and
the least likely to succeed; it represents a small part
of a larger scatter-gun approach that seems committed
to firing anything that constitutionally moves. The
gun lobby's efforts to target those provisions of the
Act that touch on Charter matters seem closer to the
target, but they still likely are outside of its constitutional range and argumentative fire-power. For
instance, the contention that section 7's guarantee of
life liberty and security of the person can be used to
ground some kind of American-style right to bear
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arms is fanciful in the extreme; if anything, section
7 can be viewed as protecting people from guns
rather than enhancing gun ownership. Also, the gun
lobby and their lawyer's claims that sections of the
FirearmsAct infringe people's rights to be safe from
"unreasonable search and seizure" and from "cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment" are difficult to
sustain. Regarding the former claim, the courts have
held that it is not unreasonable to allow spot-check
inspections to be carried out in relation to regulated
activity so as to monitor compliance with appropriate
safety or health standards. 4 There is particular
concern about the ability to inspect residential dwellings and, in this regard, the Act makes those inspections, absent a judicially-authorized search warrant,
illegal without reasonable notice and the consent of
the occupant. Regarding the latter claim, while the
courts have been solicitous to protect people from the
imposition of minimum sentences where the sentence
might be "grossly disproportionate" to the criminalised conduct, they have not condemned out-ofhand the imposition of minimum sentences where the
context is serious enough.42 Moreover, even if the
gun lobby's arguments prevailed on these matters, it
would not jeopardize the whole legislation, but only
particular severable parts of it.

PARTING SHOTS

The most pressing and deserving constitutional
argument being made by the gun lobby against the
FirearmsAct concerns its potential infringement of
aboriginal and treaty rights that are entrenched by
section 35. It is clear that many Aboriginal people
who have a constitutionally-protected right to hunt
also have the right to possess a firearm for that
purpose. The pertinent question, following the
Sparrow decision,43 is whether the impediments to
exercising these constitutional rights are justifiable as
reasonable regulations that are warranted by a "compelling and substantial objective" and interfere with
the particular right as little as necessary. This difficult to judge, but the federal government's efforts to
engage in consultations with affected Aboriginal
groups and its willingness to make special arrangements to administer the licensing system as it
involves Aboriginal peoples will go much of the way
to satisfying the constitutional requirements of section
35. Nevertheless, although concern for the position of
Aboriginal groups is admirable, one cannot help but
be a little suspicious of lobbyists who 'convert' to the
aboriginal cause only when it is in their own best
interests to do so: fair-weather friends are no friends
at all.

Endnotes
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In conclusion, therefore, it can be reported that
the Canadian government lost in their shoot-out with
the tobacco lobby, at least temporarily. Nevertheless,
there are indications that victory might have been
won at too high- a price; having won the battle, the
tobacco lobby might actually have put themselves in
danger of losing the war. In manner of speaking, it
might be choking on its own success; the decision
might galvanise a weak government to take a stronger
stand. However, it might be that, in the constitutional
showdown between Ottawa and the tobacco lobby,
one of the federal stray bullets hit the unsuspecting
gun lobby and caught them unawares. The decision in
RJR-MacDonald has. strengthened the government's
hand in silencing the outraged cries of the gun lobby
- the FirearmsAct will likely not fall for want of
federal jurisdiction. Smoking guns, indeed.U
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